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ABSTRACT 
  
This paper uses historical fluctuations in temperature within countries to identify its 
effects on aggregate economic outcomes. We find three primary results. First, higher 
temperatures substantially reduce economic growth in poor countries. Second, higher 
temperatures may reduce growth rates, not just the level of output. Third, higher 
temperatures have wide-ranging effects, reducing agricultural output, industrial output, 
and political stability. These findings inform debates over climate’s role in economic 
development and suggest the possibility of substantial negative impacts of higher 
temperatures on poor countries. 
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 At least since Montesquieu’s The Spirit of Laws (1750), which argued that an “excess of 
heat” made men “slothful and dispirited”, it has been debated whether temperature is – or is not – 
central to understanding economic development.  In this paper, we use historical fluctuations in 
temperature within countries to identify its effects on aggregate economic outcomes. We use this 
approach to inform old debates about the role of temperature in economic development and new 
debates about possible impacts of future warming.  
The relationship between temperature and aggregate economic activity has traditionally 
been quantified using two approaches. One approach, emphasized in the growth and 
development literatures, has examined the relationship between average temperature and 
aggregate economic variables in cross-sections of countries (e.g. Sachs and Warner 1997; 
Gallup, Sachs, and Mellinger 1998; Nordhaus 2006).  In contemporary data, it is well known that 
hot countries tend to be poor, with national income falling 8.5% per degree Celsius in the world 
cross-section (Dell et al. 2009).  However, many argue that this correlation is driven by spurious 
associations of temperature with national characteristics such as institutional quality (e.g., 
Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2002; Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi 2004). 
The second approach relies on micro-evidence to quantify various climatic effects and 
then aggregates these to produce a net effect on national income.  This approach is embedded 
within Integrated Assessment Models (IAM), which are utilized extensively in the climate 
change literature to model climate-economy interactions and form the basis of many policy 
recommendations regarding greenhouse gas emissions. A fundamental challenge for this 
approach is complexity: the set of candidate mechanisms through which temperature may 
influence economic outcomes is large and, even if each mechanism could be enumerated and its 
operation understood, specifying how they interact and aggregate poses substantial difficulties.  
The climate literature, at the micro level, suggests a wide array of potential temperature effects, 
including influences on agricultural productivity, mortality, physical performance, cognitive 
performance, crime, and social unrest, among other outcomes, many of which do not feature in 
current implementations of the enumerative models.1
                                                 
1 On agriculture, see, e.g., Adams et al. 1990, Mendelsohn et al. 2001, Schlenker and Roberts 2006, Deschenes and 
Greenstone 2007, and Guiteras 2007.  On health, see, e.g. Curriero et al. 2002, Deschenes and Moretti 2007, 
Deschenes and Greenstone 2007, Gallup and Sachs 2001, and Sachs and Malaney 2002.  On labor productivity, see, 
e.g., Huntington 1915, Meese et al. 1982, and Graff Zivin and Neidell (2010).  On crime and social unrest, see, e.g. 
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This paper takes an alternative approach. We first construct temperature and precipitation 
data for each country and year in the world from 1950 to 2003 and combine this dataset with data 
on aggregate output. We then examine the historical relationship between changes in a country’s 
temperature and precipitation and changes in its economic performance. Our main identification 
strategy uses year-to-year fluctuations in temperature and precipitation to identify their effects.2,3
 We find three primary results. First, our estimates show large, negative effects of higher 
temperatures on growth, but only in poor countries. In poorer countries, we estimate that a 1◦C 
rise in temperature in a given year reduced economic growth in that year by about 1.3 percentage 
points. In rich countries, changes in temperature do not have a robust, discernable effect on 
growth. Changes in precipitation have relatively mild effects on national growth in both rich and 
 
By examining aggregate outcomes directly, we avoid relying on a priori assumptions about what 
mechanisms to include and how they might operate, interact, and aggregate. By utilizing 
fluctuations in temperature, we isolate its effects from time-invariant country characteristics.  
Our approach also allows more nuanced insights: beyond investigating the magnitude and locus 
of any effects, we can use the panel’s distributed lag structure to inform whether temperature 
impacts national growth rates or simply the level of income. 
                                                                                                                                                             
Field 1992, Jacob et al. 2007, and Miguel et al. 2004.  Many other possible climate-economy channels are discussed 
in the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 4th Assessment Report (IPCC 2007).  Main users of IAM models 
acknowledge that the aggregate estimates require numerous, difficult modeling decisions. For example, the Stern 
report on the economics of climate change writes: “Making such estimates is a formidable task in many ways… with 
the result that such models must make drastic, often heroic, simplifications along all stages of the climate-change 
chain. What is more, large uncertainties are associated with each element in the cycle. Nevertheless, the IAMs 
remain the best tool available for estimating aggregate quantitative global costs and risks of climate change” (Stern 
et al. 2007, p. 145). 
2 The use of annual variation to estimate the impact of climate change was pioneered by Schlenker and Roberts 
(2006) and Deschenes and Greenstone (2007), who use annual county-level U.S. data to estimate the impact of 
weather on U.S. agricultural output. Several authors have also used higher frequency data, focusing on the GDP 
effect of rainfall in Africa as an instrument for conflict (Miguel et al 2004) and to explain the African growth 
tragedy (Barrios et al. 2010).  
3 By convention, an annual realization of temperature and precipitation is termed “weather” while the word 
“climate” refers to the long-run distribution of temperature and precipitation.  This paper thus emphasizes weather 
variation, although Section IV considers historical variation at longer time scales and along a path where the world 
is becoming warmer. 
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poor countries.4
 Second, to interpret these effects, one can distinguish two potential ways temperature 
could affect economic activity: 1) influencing the level of output, for example by affecting 
agricultural yields, or 2) influencing an economy’s ability to grow, for example by affecting 
investments or institutions that influence productivity growth. By looking at multiple lags of 
temperature, we can examine whether shocks appear to have temporary or persistent impacts on 
economic output, and thus whether temperature has level or growth effects (or both). Our results 
provide some suggestive evidence, depending on the specification, that higher temperatures may 
reduce the growth rate in poor countries, not simply the level of output. Since even small growth 
effects have large consequences over time, growth effects – if they persist in the medium run – 
would imply large impacts of warming.  
 We find broadly consistent results across a wide range of alternative 
specifications.  
 Third, we find evidence that temperature affects numerous dimensions of poor countries’ 
economies, and in ways consistent with possible growth effects. While agricultural output 
contractions appear to be part of the story, we also find adverse effects of hot years on industrial 
output. Moreover, higher temperatures lead to political instability in poor countries, as evidenced 
by irregular changes in national leaders, and this political instability could plausibly reduce 
growth rates.5
 These results are identified using short-run fluctuations in temperature and precipitation, 
whereas the long-run effects of climate may be different. For example, in the long run, countries 
may adapt to a particular temperature, mitigating the short-run economic impacts that we 
 These effects sit outside the primarily agricultural focus of much economic 
research on climate change and underscore the challenges in building aggregate estimates of 
climate impacts from a narrow set of channels. They are consistent with other recent work that 
suggests that temperature can have broad impacts outside of agriculture (Hsiang 2010). These 
effects may also help explain how temperature might affect growth rates in poor countries, not 
simply the level of output. 
                                                 
4 Precipitation does show positive effects on agricultural output in poor countries, as discussed in Section III.  
5 The idea that climate shocks can affect political institutions is consistent with Brückner and Ciccone (2011), which 
shows that negative rainfall shocks lead to an increased probability of democratization in Sub-Saharan Africa.  
Burke and Leigh (2010) also find that output contractions associated with weather shocks affect the timing of 
democratic change. 
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observe. This type of adaptation may explain why our estimates of short-run economic impacts 
of temperature shocks are larger than what the overall cross-sectional relationship between 
temperature and income across the world would imply (see Section V). Alternatively, sustained 
climatic changes may have additional long-run effects on dimensions such as water tables, soil 
quality, and health, producing larger impacts (e.g., Meehl et al. 2004).6
 Although our approach cannot fully overcome these challenges, we can make some 
headway in exploring potential impacts of shifts in climate by examining medium-term 
temperature shifts within countries. Mean global land temperatures have risen nearly 1◦C since 
1970 (Brohan et al. 2006), but countries have not warmed equally. We therefore examine 
whether those countries that experienced the largest climatic shifts between early and late 
periods in our sample had the largest shifts in their growth rates. Though this approach has less 
statistical power than using annual variation, the estimated effects of increased temperature over 
10 or 15-year time horizons are similar to our annual panel estimates, showing substantial 
negative effects in poor countries. The decline in statistical precision with these medium-term 
results means that they should be interpreted with more caution than the annual panel data 
results, but the fact that they appear consistent is suggestive that the effects may persist at least 
over the medium term. 
 
Our evidence suggests specific directions in which IAMs could be modified to better 
match the historical evidence. The two key distinctions between our evidence and the 
assumptions in most IAM models are that a) our estimates show striking differences between 
rich and poor countries and b) our estimates explicitly allow growth effects of higher 
temperatures (for example, on TFP growth), not just level effects. Incorporating these effects in 
aggregate climate-economy models would help them predict long-run output paths that are 
consistent with the evidence in the short and medium run. 
Our results also inform the older debate over temperature’s role in economic 
development.  Climatic theories of development have a long history, with prominent examples 
dating to Huntington (1915), Montesquieu (1750), and even to Ibn Khaldun’s 14th Century 
Muqaddimah (Gates 1967).  Yet even with contemporary analysis there remains substantial 
                                                 
6 In the context of future global climate change, other factors such as changing sea levels, increasing frequency of 
natural disasters, and issues of biodiversity may create additional costs not captured here (IPCC 2007; Nicholls and 
Leatherman 1995) 
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debate over temperature’s aggregate effects (e.g., Acemoglu et al. 2002, Sachs 2003). Our 
estimates identify a substantial, contemporary causal effect of temperature on the development 
process, providing explicit evidence that temperature affects not only numerous sub-components 
in an economy, but aggregates into substantial impacts on national output.  
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section I introduces the data and 
provides descriptive statistics. Section II describes the estimation strategy, presents the main 
results, and considers a number of robustness checks. Section III considers channels that may 
link temperature change to national output. Section IV estimates the effects of longer-run 
temperature shifts. SectionV relates the historical panel estimates to the cross-sectional 
relationship between temperature and income, and discusses some implications of the results for 
understanding potential economic effects of climate change. Section VI concludes. 
I. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
A. Data 
 The historical weather data are taken from the Terrestrial Air Temperature and 
Precipitation: 1900-2006 Gridded Monthly Time Series, Version 1.01 (Matsuura and Willmott 
2007). This data set provides worldwide (terrestrial) monthly mean temperature and precipitation 
data at 0.5 x 0.5 degree resolution (approximately 56km x 56km at the equator). Values are 
interpolated for each grid node from an average of 20 different weather stations, with corrections 
for elevation. 
  We use geospatial software to aggregate the weather data to the country-year level. Our 
main specifications use population-weighted average temperature and precipitation, where the 
weights are constructed from 1990 population data at 30 arc second resolution (approximately 
1km at the equator) from the Global Rural-Urban Mapping Project (Balk et al. 2004). We also 
consider averaging based on geographic area, which produces broadly similar weather variables 
for most countries.7
 For economic data, we primarily use the World Development Indicators (World Bank 
 Appendix I presents additional details about the temperature and 
precipitation data. 
                                                 
7 Countries where the weighting scheme makes a substantial difference are those with large, sparsely populated 
areas with unusual climates: Russia (Siberia), Canada (the arctic and sub-arctic areas), the United States (Alaska), 
and Australia (central Australia). 
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2007). We focus on the panel of 125 countries with at least 20 years of GDP data in the World 
Development Indicators, and consider other samples as robustness checks. We also consider 
economic growth data from the Penn World Tables Version 6.2 (Heston et al. 2006) as a 
robustness check and find very similar results. We use the World Development Indicators as our 
primary dataset given recent concerns with high frequency PWT data (Johnson et al 2009). 
B. Descriptive statistics 
 Figure 1 summarizes temperature (left graph) and precipitation (right graph) data for each 
country in the sample, plotted against log per-capita GDP in the year 2000. For each country, the 
circle symbols represent the mean levels of temperature and precipitation in the first decade of 
our sample (1950-1959), the plus symbols represent the mean levels in the last decade of our 
sample (1996-2005), and the gray lines indicate the range of annual mean levels we observe for 
that country. On average, our data show that the world has become about 1◦C warmer between 
the early and late parts of our sample. The warming trend, which is concentrated since the 1970s, 
is well-documented (e.g. Brohan et al. 2006).  
 The first panel of Figure 1 shows the tremendous temperature variation across countries: 
the hottest country in the world is Mauritania, with an average population-weighted temperature 
of 28.4 ºC, and the coldest is Mongolia, with an average population-weighted temperature of 
-1.77 ºC. Figure 1 also shows the strong relationship between temperature and per-capita income, 
with hot countries tending to be poor and cold countries rich. This relationship has been known 
since at least the 18th century (Montesquieu 1750) and has been further established using sub-
national data (Nordhaus 2006). The exceptions to this rule fall into two main groups: oil states of 
the Middle East, such as Qatar and Kuwait, which are hot and wealthy, and Communist / post-
Communist states, Mongolia and North Korea, which are cold and poor. On average, a simple 
cross-section regression in the year 2000 shows that a 1°C increase in average temperature 
predicts a fall in per-capita income by 0.085 log points (i.e. about 8 percent).  
 Looking at variability within countries, we see fluctuations in annual mean temperatures, 
with the difference between the maximum and minimum annual mean temperature within a 
country averaging 2.2°C in our baseline sample.8
                                                 
8 This max-min difference in annual means within countries ranges between 1.3 and 3.4 ºC for 95 percent of 
countries in our baseline sample. 
 Thus, the max-min variation within countries is 
more than twice the average increase in temperature observed over the period and reasonably 
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similar to estimated global temperature increases expected to occur over the next century. Figure 
1 further shows that, while there tend to be larger temperature fluctuations in cooler countries, 
the upward trend in temperature has occurred globally with similar magnitude in both hot and 
cold countries. 
 Examining the data on precipitation in the right panel of Figure 1 shows substantial 
annual variability in precipitation in all but the very driest countries. However, there is no clear 
relationship between the level of precipitation and the level of per-capita income in 2000.  
 To examine the variability further, Table 1 documents the extent of temperature and 
precipitation fluctuations within countries. While the average difference (across all countries) 
between the hottest and coldest year is 2.2°C (Figure 1), a country’s temperature deviates more 
than 1ºC from the country mean approximately once every fifteen years. Precipitation is more 
volatile, with deviations from mean rainfall of about 400-500mm appearing once every fifteen 
years. When common global or region-specific year fixed effects are removed, these deviations 
become somewhat more modest. 
II. The Effect of Temperature Fluctuations on Economic Activity 
 In this section we develop the empirical framework for the analysis of temperature 
shocks, present our main results, and consider a variety of robustness checks. 
A. Empirical framework 
 Our empirical framework follows the derivation in Bond et al. (2010). To fix ideas, 
consider the following simple economy:9
   
 
itit
T
it LAeY it
β=       (1) 
   itiitit TgAA γ+=∆ /      (2) 
where Y is aggregate output, L measures population, A measures labor productivity, and T 
measures weather. Equation (1) captures the level effect of weather on production; e.g. the effect 
of current temperature on crop yields. Equation (2) captures the growth effect of weather; e.g. the 
effect of temperature on features such as institutions that influence productivity growth. 
 Taking logs in the production function and differencing with respect to time, we have the 
                                                 
9 We focus here on this simple production model. Appendix II extends the reasoning developed here to more general 
dynamic panel models that incorporate richer lag structures and lagged dependent variables. 
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dynamic growth equation 
   1)( −−++= ititiit TTgg βγβ     (3) 
where git is the growth rate of per-capita output. The “level effects” of weather shocks on output, 
which come from equation (1), appear through β . The “growth effects” of weather shocks, 
which come from equation (2), appear through γ .10
 The growth equation in (3) allows separate identification of level effects and growth 
effects through the examination of transitory weather shocks. In particular, both effects influence 
the growth rate in the initial period of the shock. The difference is that the level effect eventually 
reverses itself as the weather returns to its prior state. For example, a temperature shock may 
reduce agricultural yields, but once temperature returns to its average value, agricultural yields 
bounce back. By contrast, the growth effect appears during the weather shock and is not 
reversed: a failure to innovate in one period leaves the country permanently further behind. The 
growth effect is identified in (3) as the summation of the temperature effects over time. 
 
 The above reasoning extends to models where temperature effects play out more 
slowly.11
 To estimate these effects, we run panel regressions of the form 
  With more general lag structures in (1) and (2), the growth effect is still identified by 
summing the lagged effects of the weather fluctuation. This standard distributed-lag result is 
demonstrated formally in Appendix II. 
                                                 
10 Rather than first-differencing (1), one could integrate (2), producing a fully-specified equation in the log level of 
output. However, as Bond et al. (2010) notes, this creates non-stationarity in both output levels (on the left-hand 
side) and accumulable factors (on the right-hand side). To avoid relying on cointegration assumptions for 
identification, Bond et al. recommend first-differencing. Appendix II presents Monte Carlo results, which show that 
the first-differencing approach is very effective at correctly identifying both level effects ( β ) and growth effects     
(γ ), whereas the integrated model with the log level of output as the dependent variable correctly identifies level 
effects ( β ) but does a poor job identifying growth effects ( γ ). Given these results, we focus on the model with 
growth as the dependent variable as in equation (3). 
11 For example, low temperatures in the latter part of one year could affect harvests the next year – which would 
generate a lagged level effect. Alternatively, a permanent shock to productivity could influence subsequent capital 
accumulation as the capital stock adjusted to its new steady state – which would generate a lagged growth effect. 
The key distinction is that, as in equation (3), level effects eventually generate equal and opposite responses through 
further lags, whereas growth effects do not. See Appendix II. 
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   it
L
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Tg ερθθ ∑ = − +++= 0    (4) 
where iθ  are country fixed effects, rtθ are time fixed effects (interacted separately with region 
dummies and a poor country dummy in our main specifications), itε  is an error term clustered 
simultaneously by country and region-year (following the two-way clustering of Cameron et al. 
2011), and Tit is a vector of annual average temperature and precipitation with up to L lags 
included.12
 We begin by estimating (4) with no lags, focusing on the null hypothesis that temperature 
does not affect growth: 
  In addition, we also consider variations of (4) that include interactions between 
weather variables and country characteristics. We have verified using Monte Carlo analysis that 
the specification in (4) produces unbiased estimates of both growth and level effects given the 
properties of our data. (See Appendix II for more details.) 
   0:)0( 00 == ρLH         
A failure to reject this hypothesis would indicate an absence of both level and growth effects. In 
subsequent regressions with lags, following the conventions in the distributed-lag literature (see 
Greene 2000), we separately test the immediate effect of temperature:  
   0:)0( 0
1
0 => ρLH        
and the cumulated effect of temperature: 
   0:)0(
0
2
0 => ∑ =
L
j j
LH ρ        
The summation of the lag coefficients corresponds to the parameter γ, the growth effect, in the 
simple model above, as well as a more general concept of growth effects in models with longer 
lag structures, as demonstrated in Appendix II. Appendix II also discusses generalizations of the 
empirical model and tests following Bond et al. (2010) that allow for more general short-run 
dynamics. As discussed in the appendix, the results from the extended dynamic model are very 
similar to the results from the simpler model developed here.  
B. Panel results 
 Table 2 examines the null hypothesis that temperature does not affect growth, either 
through level effects or growth effects. It presents results from estimating equation (4) with no 
                                                 
12 The regions are Middle East/North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America and Caribbean, Western Europe 
and offshoots, Eastern Europe and Central Asia, and Asia and Pacific Islands.  See the appendix for a full list of 
countries. 
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lags (i.e., imposing ρj = 0 for all j > 0; models with lags are examined in the next subsection). 
Column (1) of Table 2 shows a negative but statistically insignificant relationship between 
temperature fluctuations and growth on average across all countries. In column (2), we interact 
temperature with a dummy for a country being “poor”, defined as having below-median PPP-
adjusted per-capita GDP in the first year the country enters the dataset. The coefficient on the 
interaction between the “poor” dummy and temperature is negative and statistically significant, 
indicating substantial heterogeneity between poor and rich countries.13
 The next column of Table 2 adds precipitation as a control variable, and shows that 
controlling for precipitation does not substantively affect the temperature estimates. Average 
annual precipitation itself shows relatively mild effects:  an extra 100mm of annual precipitation 
is associated with a 0.08 percentage point lower growth rate in rich countries and a statistically 
insignificant 0.07 percentage point higher growth rate in poor countries. In our data, global mean 
precipitation levels have fallen nearly 100mm in the last 50 years, so a 100mm variation in 
precipitation is on the same order historically as the 1◦ C rise in temperature. By this metric, the 
effects of mean precipitation typically appear a factor of 10 times smaller than the temperature 
effect in poor countries.
 As shown in the last row 
of the table (which reports the sum of the main effect of temperature and its interaction with the 
poor dummy), the net effect of a 1◦C rise in temperature is to decrease growth rates in poor 
countries by -1.39 percentage points. Put another way, since the standard deviation of annual 
temperature once country fixed effects, region × year, and poor country × year fixed effects are 
removed is 0.50 degrees, the estimates in Table 2 imply that a one-standard deviation increase in 
annual temperature is associated with a reduction in growth of about 0.69 percentage points.  
14
                                                 
13 We have also considered quintiles of initial per-capita income rather than a binary distinction. We find the largest 
negative effects of temperature on the bottom 2 quintiles of temperature, and especially on the lowest income 
quintile. Using an interaction with a linear initial log per-capita income variable produces similar results, although 
the linear specification implies positive effects of temperature in rich countries which do not appear with either the 
rich/poor dummy or using quintiles. (See online appendix.) 
 Moreover, we show below that the statistical significance of the 
precipitation effects in rich countries is sensitive to specification, suggesting that they should be 
14 As an alternative metric, the standard deviation of precipitation across the entire sample (after removing fixed 
effects) is about 25mm, so a one-standard increase in precipitation would increase growth in poor countries by a 
(statistically insignificant) 0.02 percentage points, or about 1/40 the estimated effect of a one-standard deviation in 
temperature.  
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interpreted with caution.15
 Poorer countries tend to be both hotter and more agricultural. In columns (4) and (5) we 
consider whether being “poor” proxies for these characteristics. Column (4) adds the interaction 
between temperature and “hot”, defined as having above median temperature in the 1950s. The 
negative effect of temperature appears through being poor, not through being hot, with the poor 
coefficient remaining unchanged.
   
16 Column (5) controls for the interaction between temperature 
and “agricultural”, defined as having an above median agricultural GDP share in 1995.17 Once 
again, the negative effect of temperature appears through being poor.18
 The point estimates in Table 2 tend to show that rich countries experience increased 
growth with a rise in temperature, but this result is not statistically significant. The t-statistics are 
below 1.0 for all specifications except the last, which controls for agricultural intensity.  Looking 
ahead to further results in the paper and the Appendices, which examine alternative panel 
specifications, data sources, and samples, the econometric findings show a similar pattern – 
 While it is impossible to 
definitively separate the impacts of poverty from those of the agriculture share or mean 
temperature (or the many other variables that are correlated with poverty), this evidence suggests 
that being poor usefully characterizes a locus of substantial negative temperature effects. 
                                                 
15 In Section III below, precipitation is shown to have a more robust, positive effect on agricultural output in poor 
countries. These results on average precipitation also do not capture the impact of extreme precipitation events, such 
as extended droughts or flooding. However, Appendix Figure A3 suggests that the negative effects of precipitation 
in rich countries are driven by very large outlier events, suggesting that indeed floods may be important. Also, given 
the large heterogeneity in growing seasons between countries, we do not distinguish between rain in the growing, 
harvest, planting, or dry seasons as done, e.g., by Maccini and Yang (2009).  
16 In results not reported in the table, we have also experimented with different definitions of “hot,” such as being 
above the 75th or 90th percentiles of the world average temperature distribution, as well a linear temperature variable. 
The results from these alternative specifications are qualitatively similar to the results presented in the table.  See the 
online appendix. 
17 We use 1995 data for agricultural share because data coverage from earlier years is sparse. Using earlier data cuts 
sample sizes considerably but produces broadly similar results.  
18 As reported in the online appendix, regressions that control only for temperature fluctuations and their interaction 
with the agriculture share (i.e. not including interactions with national income) produce statistically insignificant 
effects for agriculture, further suggesting that poverty is the more informative characteristic. Furthermore, 
regressions that include linear interactions with initial income, temperature, and agriculture share (as opposed to 
binary dummies) continue to show that initial poverty is the relevant distinction. 
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typically positive but rarely statistically significant temperature effects in rich countries.  
C. Models with lags 
 The above results, using the simple model with no lags, reject the null hypothesis that 
temperature has no effect on growth in poor countries. This section considers more flexible 
models with up to 10 lags of temperature to better understand the dynamics of these temperature 
effects, nesting both the level and growth effects of temperature described in Section II.A. 
 Table 3 presents results from estimating equation (4) with no lags, one lag, five lags, or 
ten lags of the weather variables. In columns (1) – (4), temperature and its lags are the only 
weather variables included. Columns (5) – (8) present results where precipitation and its lags are 
also included. All temperature and precipitation variables are interacted with poor and rich 
country dummies. The bottom two rows of each column present, separately, the cumulated effect 
of temperature for poor and rich countries, calculated by summing the respective temperature 
variable and its lags. In models with more than one lag, given space constraints, the table reports 
only the first three lags and the sum of all the lags.19
Table 3 shows that the cumulative effect of temperature in poor countries remains 
substantially negative, with fairly stable point estimates, as more lags are included. With no lags, 
in columns (1) and (5), a one-time 1ºC temperature increase in a poor country reduces growth by 
1.35 – 1.39 percentage points. With one lag included, the cumulative effect is a reduction of 0.98 
– 1.10 percentage points. The results are broadly consistent in magnitude and statistical 
significance as we add more lags, with a 1ºC temperature increase producing a 1.04 - 1.23 
percentage point reduction in growth. The only exception is the cumulative effect with 10 lags of 
temperature, when we also include 10 lags of precipitation (column 8), which is 0.858 and no 
longer statistically significant. 
  
The individual lag coefficients show little evidence of a level effect of temperature on 
output. That is, the effects of above average temperature appear to persist in the medium-run, 
rather than being reversed. Recalling the empirical framework from Section II.A, level effects 
are reversed when the temperature shock is reversed. In the model with one lag – i.e., columns 
(2) and (6) – a level effect would appear as equal and opposite coefficients on the immediate 
effect and the first lag. More generally, even if level effects occur with lags – i.e., if last year’s 
temperature affects this year’s harvest – level effects are eventually reversed once the shock 
                                                 
19 The full set of lags for Table 3, Column 10 is reported in Appendix Table A34.  
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disappears. Therefore, to the extent temperature effects are level effects, the cumulated sum of 
the temperature effect and all its lags should be zero. That the lags in Table 3 do not sum to zero 
suggests that the effects of temperature persist in the medium run; i.e., they look more like 
growth effects than level effects.  
Of course, temperature effects may be mitigated beyond the 10-year horizon examined 
here. In Section IV, we consider an alternative empirical approach that examines longer-run 
historical relationships between changes in temperature and changes in growth. That analysis 
finds longer-run effects that are broadly consistent with these panel results but less statistically 
significant than the findings in Table 3. 
D. Robustness 
 This section considers a variety of robustness checks, summarized in Table 4.  Numerous 
additional analyses are presented in the Appendix.  We consider robustness to alternative panel 
specifications, samples and data sources, and further examine non-linear temperature effects.  
1. Panel specifications 
We find that the results are broadly consistent across a range of alternative panel 
specifications, particularly the results with no lags. In Table 4, Panel A reports the results from 
models with no lags, while Panels B and C report cumulative effects from models with five and 
ten lags respectively.20  To facilitate comparisons, the relevant results from Tables 2 and 3 are 
repeated in the first column of Table 4. The results in column (2), which incorporate country-
specific trends as well as region × year and poor × year fixed effects, appear to be somewhat 
larger in magnitude than the baseline results, suggesting that the results are not being driven by 
secular time trends within countries.21
                                                 
20 The results in Panel A correspond to column 3 of Table 2. Panels B and C correspond to columns 7 and 8 of Table 
3. Results from models with one and three lags are qualitatively similar and are omitted to conserve space.   
 As discussed in Appendix II and presented in Appendix 
Table A1, the results are robust to more general dynamic panel regression models that use 
21 Including country and region x year fixed effects only (i.e., dropping the poor x year fixed effects) produces 
similar estimated temperature effects in poor countries to the baseline results, though the results with 5 and 10 lags 
attenuate somewhat. Similar results also emerge when we use common global year fixed effects instead of region x 
year fixed effects and also drop the poor x year fixed effects. We have also estimated a first differenced version of 
(4). This produces very similar results for the 0 lag model, while the estimates become substantially more negative 
and more imprecise as we add additional lags. These results are available in the online appendix. 
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various lag structures.  As an additional specification check, Appendix Tables A37-38 report 
regressions that include one to ten leads of temperature. In no case are the leads significant, even 
when the contemporaneous temperature term is omitted. When controlling for leads, the 
contemporaneous and cumulated lag temperature effects remain of similar magnitude to those in 
the main results.  
Finally, we have also investigated alternative formulations of the temperature and 
precipitation variables. First, we have considered using logs rather than levels of annual average 
temperature and precipitation. This specification strengthens the results. Second, we have 
constructed weather anomalies, normalizing annual temperature and precipitation by subtracting 
each country’s mean and dividing by each country’s standard deviation. This specification 
produces similarly-sized impacts although standard errors typically increase, suggesting a model 
based on absolute temperature differences may be more appropriate. These results are all 
available in the online appendix. 
2. Sample and data sources 
Since countries’ growth data starts at different dates, Table 4 (column 3) repeats the main 
specification on a balanced sample where all countries are present in the sample for the entire 
period.22
 Table 4 column (5) reconsiders the main specification using growth data from the Penn 
World Tables rather than the WDI. The results are very similar, though the 10 lag result is now 
statistically significant. Column (6) uses temperature and precipitation data aggregated using 
area-weighting rather than population-weighting and shows similar effects, though the zero-lag 
effect for rich countries is now statistically significant.
 The point estimates are almost identical to the baseline results, although the standard 
errors in the 5 and 10 lag specifications increase, as one might expect given that we have reduced 
the amount of data in the model. Expanding the data to include countries with less than 20 years 
of data also continues to show substantial negative effects in poor countries (column 4), with 
little change from the baseline specification.   
23
                                                 
22 Note that temperature and precipitation data is present over the entire period, so having different start dates for the 
growth data is not an issue for calculating the lags in the model, since we can always calculate the lags of the 
weather data even if the growth data is missing. 
  Splitting the sample into Sub-Saharan 
23 Weighting by rural population or urban population yields similar results to using total population weights; see the 
online appendix.  
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African countries (column 7) and all other countries (column 8),  the model with zero lags shows 
that the negative impacts of temperature are especially pronounced in Sub-Saharan Africa, but 
are still negative and statistically significant elsewhere, and the difference between the Sub-
Saharan Africa and non- Sub-Saharan Africa samples is not statistically significant.24 When we 
examine either the five or ten lag models, the negative point estimates are comparable in 
magnitude in both samples.25
National accounts are notoriously hard to measure, particularly in developing countries 
(Deaton and Heston 2010; Ciccone and Jarocinski 2010; Young 2009). To investigate the extent 
to which measurement problems in the data are driving the results, we have examined the impact 
of temperature on exports. Since exports from poor countries are reported by the importing 
countries, these data are much more accurately measured than national accounts data. As 
reported in Jones and Olken (2010), analyzing export growth data as recorded by the U.S. and 
other importing countries shows similarly large negative effects of increased temperature on poor 
countries’ exports, but not on rich countries’ exports.  This finding indicates that the core panel 
finding is not driven by potentially low-quality national accounts data in poor countries. 
  
Finally, we have investigated concerns that the temperature and precipitation data quality 
may be lower for poor countries, and concerns in particular that weather stations may enter or 
exit our sample in response to economic conditions. First, we have repeated our analysis of 
Africa with a number of alternative weather datasets.26
                                                 
24 Given the very small number (3) of rich countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, we group these together into a unified 
Sub-Saharan African sample. 
 Results are broadly similar in all samples, 
although limited size for alternative data sets reduces the estimates’ precision. Second, the 
GHCN dataset (the main underlying source for the Matsuura and Willmott (2007) data we use 
here) indicates whether a weather station is missing an observation in a given year. Using panel 
regression models, we find no relationship between economic conditions or political instability 
25 Our results do differ from Barrios et al. (2010), who in their investigation of rainfall in Sub-Saharan Africa 
include temperature as a control in one specification, finding no effects. Our specification differs from theirs on 
many dimensions; Barrios et al examine fewer countries and fewer years of data, use a different temperature 
variable, and use a somewhat different empirical specification.  
26 These alternative datasets are the Global Precipitation Climatology Project, the National Center for Environment 
Prediction, and the UN Food and Agricultural Organization Climatic Data, which provide alternative precipitation 
series.  See online appendix for analysis and further discussion. 
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and the number of weather stations that are missing data in a given country and year.27
3. Non-Linear Temperature Effects 
 
In our analysis, temperature enters linearly, whereas one might suspect that temperature 
has non-linear effects.28
We have also conducted additional analysis of nonlinear effects of the average 
temperature variable, finding little evidence for such non-linearities. First, we verified that both 
hot and cold deviations from the national temperature mean have effects of similar absolute 
magnitude on growth. Second, we found that temperature shocks do not affect poor countries 
differentially depending on whether the country is typically hot or cold, though the tiny number 
of cold poor countries prevents a definitive conclusion.
 To further investigate this possibility, beyond the interaction terms 
examined in Table 2, we examined more flexible aggregations of the sub-national temperature 
data. Using daily temperature and precipitation data available on a 1.0 x 1.0 degree grid (NCC 
2005), we calculated the number of ‘people-days’ spent at each temperature and precipitation 
level throughout the year for each country. We then repeated the panel analysis above (e.g., 
equation (4) with no lags) allowing the temperature and precipitation effects to vary arbitrarily at 
different temperature and precipitation ranges. Unfortunately, we did not have sufficient power 
to tease out detailed effects of the distribution of days within different temperature ranges, given 
that our dependent variable is measured at the annual, country level. While the results are 
imprecise, the point estimates suggest that the impact of temperature on GDP is roughly linear, 
supporting the focus on annual averages (see the online appendix). 
29
                                                 
27 In particular, we run panel regressions relating the share of stations that are missing in a given country and year 
(the dependent variable) to economic growth and political instability measures (interacted with poor country 
dummies). These regressions show no effect of these economic and political variables on station reporting in poor 
countries.  See the online appendix. 
 Although our power to assess non-
linearities is limited given the few degrees of variation in temperature within each country, the 
evidence here does not show substantial nonlinearities. 
28 For example, Deschenes and Greenstone (2007a, 2007b) find non-linear temperature effects for agriculture and 
mortality, and Schlenker, Hanemann, and Fisher (2006), Schlenker and Roberts (2006), and Schlenker and Roberts 
(2009) find important non-linear temperature effects for agriculture. 
29 These results are presented in Appendix Table A39. 
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III. Channels 
The large and persistent effects of temperature shocks on aggregate output in poor 
countries suggest further investigation of the temperature-economy relationship. Many 
macroeconomic models of climatic effects emphasize a limited set of channels, especially 
agriculture, and income level effects, rather than effects on factor accumulation or other 
dimensions that could impact growth.  The microeconomic literature, by contrast, considers 
broader dimensions of climatic effects, including physical and cognitive labor productivity, 
conflict, and health, all of which could have economy-wide implications.30
Note that these analyses are reduced-form, and therefore do not identify the possibly 
complex structural relationships between temperature, growth, and other outcomes. For example, 
higher temperature could lead directly to political instability by making a population more prone 
to riot (United States Riot Commission, 1968; Carlsmith and Anderson, 1979). Conversely 
higher temperatures could lower agriculture yields, with the resulting GDP reduction provoking 
political instability. Teasing out structural relationships between these many variables would 
require a number of ad hoc identifying assumptions and lies far beyond the scope of this single 
study. We focus instead on net effects, which we can identify clearly, to shed light on the breadth 
and type of potential channels through which temperature may affect aggregate output. The 
results, which show impacts not only on agriculture, but also on industrial output and political 
stability, emphasize temperature’s broad influences. 
  At the same time, the 
micro evidence often comes from local environments, usually in rich countries, which may or 
may not extend to national settings or to poor countries. In this section, we apply our panel 
methodology to explore whether the effects of temperature are primarily limited to agriculture, or 
whether temperature affects other important dimensions.  Such analysis tests the narrow focus of 
mainstream aggregate climate-economy models and may also help inform our finding of possible 
growth effects in the distributed lag structure. 
A. Agriculture, Industry, and Investment 
Table 5 examines the impact of temperature and precipitation on several components of 
GDP. Panel A begins with zero-lag models to test the null hypotheses of no effects of 
temperature. Columns (1) through (3) examine growth in agricultural value-added, industrial 
                                                 
30 Footnote 1 provides a brief summary of this very large literature.   
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value-added, and aggregate investment respectively.31
The results in Panel A show substantial, negative effects of temperature in poor countries 
on agricultural and industrial value-added. Column (1) shows that a 1◦C higher temperature in 
poor countries is associated with 2.66 percentage points lower growth in agricultural output. For 
wealthier countries, the point estimate is substantially smaller and not statistically significant, 
showing 0.22 percentage points lower growth in agricultural output for each additional 1◦C of 
temperature. As might be expected, precipitation positively impacts agriculture – each additional 
100mm of annual rainfall is associated with 0.18 percentage points higher growth in agricultural 
output in poor countries and 0.16 percentage points higher growth in agricultural output in richer 
countries – though these effects are not statistically significant.
 These variables are taken from the World 
Development Indicators. 
32
Column (2) of Panel A shows negative temperature impacts on the growth of industrial 
value-added in poor countries. Specifically, a 1◦C higher temperature in poor countries is 
associated with 2.04 percentage points lower growth in industrial output. In related work, Jones 
and Olken (2010) examine export growth in 2-digit trade data, and also find negative effects of 
temperature on both agricultural products and industrial products in poor countries.  Many of the 
industrial sectors affected by temperature in the exports data, such as electronic equipment and 
light metal manufactures, are not downstream processors of agricultural products. Hsiang (2010) 
also documents similar impacts on industrial output in his study of temperature shocks in 28 
Caribbean countries. The results on investment in column (3) also suggest negative impacts of 
temperature in poor countries, though the results are not statistically significant.
 
33
                                                 
31 We find negative effects of similar magnitude on the residual category, services, which is typically computed as 
the difference between total value-added and the sum of agricultural and industrial value added (see online 
appendix). 
  
32 Note that we are estimating only the average impact of temperature and precipitation, without accounting for 
whether it was in the season that would most beneficial or harmful to agricultural production. This likely creates an 
errors-in-variables problem, which may suggest that we are understating the true effect of temperature and 
precipitation on agriculture (see, e.g. Shlenker and Roberts PNAS 2009). 
33 Note, however, that there is a weakly significant precipitation effect in rich countries. Using daily data on 
precipitation (NCC 2005), we find that having a larger number of days with very high precipitation has a significant 
negative effect on aggregate output in rich countries (see online appendix). One conjecture is that construction 
responds negatively to rain, providing the investment effect.  Note also that aggregate investment in poor countries 
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Panel B examines the lag structure of these effects. For each dependent variable (growth 
in agriculture, growth in industry, and growth in investment), we present results with 1, 5, and 10 
lags. For all three dependent variables, the impact effect – i.e., the coefficient on 
contemporaneous temperature – is negative and large, though the investment variable is not 
statistically significant. For agriculture, the point estimates of the cumulative effects, while 
imprecise, are somewhat smaller than the immediate effects, suggesting the presence of some 
combination of growth and level effects for these variables. For industrial value added, the point 
estimates of the cumulative effects are closer in magnitude to the immediate effect. 
These findings on industrial value added reject a narrow view of climatic effects.  While 
confirming agricultural effects, the results further show large shocks to industrial output growth 
in poor countries. There are several possible, non-mutually exclusive explanations for 
temperature’s impact on industrial output. First, this effect could partly represent a demand-side 
spillover from the negative effect of temperature on agricultural output.  Second, this effect may 
reflect labor productivity losses, consistent with a large literature documenting the impact of 
temperature on output in factory and other settings. For example, Graff Zivin and Niedell (2010) 
demonstrate substantial contractions in labor supply on hot days in those U.S. industries with 
high exposure to weather (e.g., those with work outdoors and those without access to air 
conditioning).34
                                                                                                                                                             
does show a statistically significant decline of 3.0 percentage points when using the full Penn World Tables sample, 
which is 50% larger.  
 Their estimated magnitudes are large: for high temperature exposure 
34 Building on classic ideas in economic development that link productivity to temperature (Montesquieu 1750, 
Marshall 1890), Huntington (1915) documented that high temperature reduces the productivity of piece-rate 
Connecticut factory workers and Florida cigar-makers. More recently, Link and Pepler (1970), Wyon (1976), Meese 
et al. (1982), and others have found substantial negative impacts of higher temperatures on the productivity of 
factory workers.  More generally, the large literature on climate and productivity, which includes laboratory 
experiments and experiments in actual work places (i.e. factories, call centers, and office buildings), robustly finds a 
decrement in work performance when temperatures exceed those associated with thermal neutrality. The review of 
Seppanen et al. (2003) finds a median 2% decrement in work performance per degree Celsius temperature rise above 
25 degrees Celsius. Moreover, in a meta-analysis of more than 150 studies, Ramsey and Kwon (1992) distinguish 
between simple mental tasks (i.e. simple perpetual motor, reaction time) and more complex tasks (i.e. tracking, 
vigilance, dual tasks). While effects of heat stress appear limited or simple mental tasks, statistically significant 
effects appear at high temperatures for the second class of tasks. Simpler tasks may be less affected because when 
the body becomes impaired by or expends energy to counteract the negative impacts of heat stress (i.e. dehydration, 
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occupations, temperatures over 100 degrees Fahrenheit (37.7 degrees C) lead to 23% lower labor 
supply than temperatures between 76-80 degrees Fahrenheit (24.4 – 26.6 degrees C). If poor 
countries’ industrial sectors are more sensitive to temperature than those of rich countries (for 
example, because they are not air conditioned), then these types of labor supply or other labor 
productivity effects could explain the substantial impact of temperature on manufacturing that 
we observe. 
B. Political economy 
Temperature may also impact growth if increased temperature leads to political 
instability, which in turn may impede factor accumulation and productivity growth. Empirically, 
political instability is associated with lower economic growth (Alesina et al. 1996), and there is 
substantial empirical evidence that riots and protests are more likely in warmer weather (e.g., 
United States Riot Commission 1968; Carlsmith and Anderson 1979; Boyanowsky 1999).35
We examine the impact of temperature on several measures of political instability. First, 
the Polity IV dataset (Marshall and Jaggers 2004) rates the political system in each country 
annually from -10 (fully autocratic) to +10 (fully democratic). This POLITY variable further 
designates “interregnum periods”, which are years when the political system is in flux and no 
clear political regime has emerged.  
 
Alternatively, economic impacts of higher temperatures might provoke dissatisfied citizens to 
seek institutional change (Burke and Leigh 2010, Bruckner and Ciccone 2011). 
The second set of measures comes from the Archigos dataset on political leaders 
(Goemans et al. 2006). This dataset classifies the primary national political leader for each 
country and year and codes all leader transitions into two categories: “regular” transitions, which 
take place according to the prevailing institutional rules of the country, and “irregular” 
transitions (such as coups), which do not follow the prevailing institutional rules. We consider a 
dummy variable for years with leadership transitions, as well as separate dummy variables for 
regular and irregular transitions.  
                                                                                                                                                             
increased sweating and loss of sodium, etc), the automatic processes in simple tasks are prioritized over complex 
cognitive tasks that are typically less essential for survival. 
35 Medical studies have documented that levels of platelet paroxitine – a chemical that blocks impulsivity and 
aggression – fall when temperatures increase and have linked low levels of platelet paroxitine to higher rates of 
aggression (Tihonen et al. 1997). Violent crime also increases with temperature (Jacob et al. 2007). 
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The results are presented in Table 6. Looking first at POLITY, an additional 1°C in poor 
countries is associated with a 2.7 percentage point increase in the probability of any change in 
POLITY.36, 37
Combined, the POLITY and Archigos data tell a similar story: higher temperatures are 
associated with political instability in poor countries. Whether temperature has direct effects on 
political instability, which in turn affects economic growth, or whether temperature has direct 
effects on economic growth, which in turn affects political instability – or both – is difficult to 
distinguish, since poor economic performance and political instability are likely mutually 
reinforcing. Nevertheless, the impact of temperature on political instability in poor countries is 
suggestive of an institutional mechanism through which temperature might affect productivity 
growth, rather than just the level of income.
 The Archigos results show a similar pattern and are stronger statistically. A one 
degree rise of temperature raises the probability of leader transitions by 3.1 percentage points in 
poor countries (column 2). Moreover, this effect comes not from regular leadership transitions 
(column 3) but from irregular leader transitions – i.e. coups (column 4). This effect of 4.4 
percentage points is large, as the baseline probability of an irregular leader transition is only 4.5 
percent per year in poor countries. By contrast, we see no effects on leader transitions in rich 
countries.  
38
The final columns of Table 6 consider the impact of temperature on conflict. We use the 
PRIO conflict data (PRIO 2006), which indicates for every country-year whether the country was 
involved in a high-intensity conflict (defined as ≥ 1,000 conflict deaths / year) or a low-intensity 
conflict (defined as 25 to 1000 conflict deaths / year). Column (5) examines the start of conflicts 
(i.e., the probability a conflict begins given no conflict in the previous period), and column (6) 
 
                                                 
36 In the appendix, we decompose this change into contemporaneous increases in POLITY (towards democracy), 
decreases (towards autocracy), or shifts into interregnum periods (between regimes). We find about half of the 
changes induced by temperature are decreases in POLITY and about half are interregnum periods, though the 
decomposition is weak statistically. See Appendix Table A36.  
37 The results on precipitation appear smaller, but suggest that political change in poor countries is more likely in 
years with lower rainfall. 
38 These results, emphasizing political instability, complement but differ from recent literature finding that weather-
associated output contractions predict democratization (Burke and Leigh 2010, Bruckner and Ciccone 2011).  Here 
we look at a more general class of political changes and make no claim that the effects of temperature shocks are felt 
on political variables through an output channel. 
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examines the end of conflicts (i.e., the probability a conflict ends given conflict in the previous 
period).39 We find no significant effect of temperature on either the start or conclusion of 
conflicts.40
IV. Medium-run Estimates 
 The political impacts of temperature thus appear more concentrated in political 
instability rather than civil or interstate wars. 
In this section, we re-examine the historical data to investigate temperature shifts over the 
medium run. The above, short-run panel estimates indicate substantial effects of temperature 
shocks in poor countries, with per-capita income growth falling approximately 1 percentage 
point for a 1◦C rise in temperature. In the medium run, the effect of sustained temperature 
increases might attenuate over time if economies adapt. On the other hand, sustained higher 
temperatures may reinforce growth-related problems by placing continued pressure on political 
systems or other relevant factors.  
 We therefore consider the longer-run analogue of our panel specification, examining the 
relationship between temperature changes and growth changes in the early and late periods in our 
dataset. There is substantial heterogeneity in temperature increases over this period, with 
countries such as Tunisia, Zambia, and Botswana warming by approximately 1◦C since the mid 
1980s, while others such as Laos, Kenya, and Nigeria experienced almost no warming over the 
same period. We exploit this variation to ask whether countries with sustained warming saw 
sustained changes in growth.  
Specifically, we estimate the following regression 
   iiirii TTgg εγθα +−++=− )( 1212       
where 1ig  is the mean growth rate in country i in the early period (1970-1985 in our main 
                                                 
39 Given how rare conflicts are, we use year fixed effects rather than region-by-year fixed effects in these 
specifications. 
40 These results differ from Miguel et al. (2004), who find - also using the PRIO dataset - that greater precipitation is 
associated with a lower probability of conflict. We have replicated the Miguel et al. results in our data, and find that 
the differences between the findings in Table 6 and those in Miguel et al. come from a different sample of countries 
(Miguel et al. examine only Sub-Saharan African countries from 1981-1999) and the fact that Miguel et al. use a 
somewhat different empirical specification from the one in Table 6. These replication results are presented in the 
online appendix. 
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specification), and 2ig  is the mean growth rate in the late period (1986-2000).
41
1iT
 Mean 
temperature and precipitation in these periods are  and 2iT , while rθ  captures region fixed 
effects and a dummy for being poor, and iε  is an independently distributed error term. This first-
differenced regression is the longer-run version of the fixed effects panel model in equation (4). 
To see this, start with equation (4) with no lags, take averages of the left- and right-hand sides for 
a given period, and then first-difference. We have one observation per country, having 
differenced out any initial conditions or other fixed national characteristics that might influence 
growth.42
 A graphical version of the results is shown in Figure 2, and the regression results are 
shown in Table 7. Figure 2 plots the change in growth between the 1970-1985 and 1985-2000 
against the change in average temperature during the same periods, separately for poor and rich 
countries, along with a simple regression line (and associated standard errors). The graphs show 
a statistically significant downward sloping relationship in poor countries, with no statistically 
significant relationship in rich countries.
 
43
Turning to Table 7, the baseline specification compares the 1970-1985 period to the 
1986-2000 period and shows substantial, statistically significant negative effects of warming on 
poor countries. In column (1), a temperature rise of 1◦ C reduces annual growth in poor countries 
by 1.9 percentage points. The inclusion of region fixed effects does not substantially change this 
effect, as shown in column (2), though the result is no longer statistically significant. When we 
use median regressions to reduce the impact of outliers (columns 3 and 4), the estimated impact 
for poor countries becomes slightly larger and substantially more statistically significant. We 
have also examined robustness to using alternative comparison years. In all cases the temperature 
effect on poor countries is – as in Column 2 - negative but not statistically significant (see 
 
                                                 
41 We begin in the 1970s, rather than an earlier decade such as the 1960s, because we lose most of the poor countries 
in our sample when we extend the sample back to the 1960s. We present results for a variety of alternative time 
periods below. 
42 Note also that, in cross-section, average growth is substantially lower in warmer countries over this period. While 
interesting, this is less well identified than the first differenced results, which net out unobserved fixed country 
characteristics. 
43 The point estimates for rich countries suggest an upward slope, although it is not statistically significant, and 
flattens further when using median regression (see Table 7).   
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Appendix Table A40). When we split the sample into Sub-Saharan African countries (column 5) 
and all other countries (column 6), we find similar effects in both samples, though the estimates 
are not statistically significant.44
V. Discussion 
 Finally, using PWT data instead of WDI data we estimate that a 
1◦ C increase in temperature reduces annual growth in poor countries by 2.3 percentage points 
(column 7).  Overall, this analysis provides some suggestive evidence that the effects seen in the 
annual data persist over the medium run. Put another way, we find little evidence that poor 
countries eliminate all negative consequences of warming over the time horizons considered 
here. 
A. Temperature and economic development 
The negative cross-sectional association between temperature and per-capita income (see 
Figure 1) has long been known (e.g., Huntington 1915). Yet there has been a vigorous debate 
over whether this correlation is due to a direct impact of temperature on economic activity (e.g., 
Sachs 2003), or whether some third variable (e.g., a country’s institutions) drives prosperity in 
contemporary times, leaving little or no room for geography (e.g., Acemoglu, Johnson and 
Robinson 2002; Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi 2004). This debate has primarily proceeded by 
treating temperature variables as fixed for a given country, which makes testing these alternative 
hypotheses challenging. 
By using temperature variation within countries, we can better identify its effects. Our 
results show that temperature per se has an important impact on national economic performance. 
While not ruling out many other forces that may play important roles in economic development,  
the evidence here rejects the hypothesis that temperature does not influence national production.  
Moreover, the estimated impacts are large in magnitude – in fact, more than large enough to 
explain the cross-sectional temperature-income relationship between rich and poor countries. To 
see this, recall from that the cross-sectional relationship shows a decline in per-capita income of 
8.5 log points, or about 8 percent, for a 1°C increase in temperature (see Figure 1). Our panel 
estimates show that a 1°C temperature increase reduces poor country growth rates by 1.3 
percentage points.  In a world with no adaptation, our panel estimates imply that cross-country 
                                                 
44 As in Table 4 above, because nearly all countries in Sub-Saharan Africa are poor, we do not separately distinguish 
between rich and poor countries when focusing on this region. 
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temperature differences would need to be sustained for only 7 years to generate the cross-
sectional correlation between temperature and per-capita income seen in Figure 1.45
B. Building estimates for the impact of future climate change 
 In practice, 
adaptation may mitigate these effects substantially in the long run.  
Estimating the future implications of climatic change is a difficult exercise given 
numerous uncertainties about the extent of climatic change and the economic effects that may 
ensue. Our estimates use recent historical evidence to inform the short- and medium-run 
consequences of temperature increases, but bridging to long-run implications is more 
challenging.  First, countries may adapt to permanent changes in climate more successfully than 
they adapt to the annual or decade-long temperature shocks that we examine empirically.  
Adaptation can take place at a local level but also at a global level, where new adaptive 
technologies may be developed that find wide-scale use.46 Second, several potential effects of 
future climatic change, including potential effects on sea levels, biodiversity, and storm 
frequency, are not captured within our historical analysis. Third, global-scale general equilibrium 
effects, including adjustments in trade patterns and convergence forces, may offset asymmetric 
national effects on poor countries.47
While tackling these challenges is beyond the scope of this paper, its findings do suggest 
important ways in which future implementations of climate-economy models could be modified 
to better match the historical climate-economy relationship.  First, current climate-economy 
models are built around a relatively narrow set of channels – primarily agriculture – through 
which climate could impact economic activity.  Our analysis finds large effects – in industrial 
value-added and political stability – that are not considered by most current IAM climate-
economy analyses.  Second, IAM approaches often build underlying sector-specific models from 
evidence of behavior in rich countries.  Our results, whether looking at aggregate output or 
   
                                                 
45 Dell, Jones, and Olken (2009) considers how explicit assumptions about adaptation, convergence, and other forces 
over the long-run can reconcile short and long-run empirical relationships between temperature and income. 
46 To investigate the possibility of global adaptation, we have looked at whether the estimated impacts of 
temperature become less pronounced over time. While the point estimates suggest smaller temperature impacts in 
more recent decades, the difference is not statistically significant. See Appendix Tables A31 and A32. 
47 A key advantage of the panel analysis in this paper is to enhance identification by sweeping out fixed effects for 
country and time.  However, this approach by necessity eliminates the capacity to estimate global-scale effects. 
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underlying channels, repeatedly demonstrate that poor countries experience extremely different 
(and negative) effects compared to rich countries, so extrapolating analyses of rich-countries is 
likely to understate effects in poorer regions. Finally, most existing literature assumes that 
temperature will affect the level of output, as opposed to the growth rate of output.  In our 
method, we consider the possibility of both level and growth effects. Because growth effects 
compound over time, even modest growth effects can accumulate into large income effects.  
VI. Conclusion 
 This paper examines the historical relationship between temperature fluctuations and 
economic growth.  We find substantial effects of temperature shocks, but only in poor countries. 
In poor countries, a 1◦C rise in temperature in a given year reduces economic growth by 1.3 
percentage points on average. The estimates further suggest that temperature shocks may affect 
the rate of economic growth, rather than just the level of output.  However, whereas the short-run 
impacts appear very robust, the case for persistent growth effects in the distributed lag structure 
depends on the specification. Estimates using medium-run shifts from 1970 to 2000 rather than 
annual variation produce similar though noisy estimates, suggesting that adaptation may not 
undo the effects of temperature changes in the medium term.  
By focusing on fluctuations in temperature, we seek to inform old debates over 
temperature’s role in economic development and new debates over future impacts of climate 
change. Our findings of large effects of temperature shocks on poor countries provide 
counterevidence to claims that temperature does not influence national production.  While higher 
temperatures reduce agricultural output in poor countries, we also find that they lead to 
reductions in industrial output and political stability. These results underscore the breadth of 
mechanisms underlying the climate-economy relationship and emphasize channels not usually 
considered in the aggregate climate literature.  Further work is needed to identify precise causal 
mechanisms surrounding each of these channels. While teasing out the mechanisms is 
challenging, this paper suggests such analysis is of first-order importance, as the economic 
effects in poor countries appear large. 
Given uncertainty over adaptation, international spillovers, technical change, and other 
issues, the estimates here – driven primarily from short-run fluctuations in temperature – cannot 
alone provide precise predictions about the estimated impacts of future climate change.  The 
results do, however, provide clear guidance on critical economic dimensions that integrated 
 27 
assessment models and other attempts to think about global climate change should incorporate.  
A credible model should be able to match the historical moments in the data uncovered here: the 
stark differences between rich and poor countries, the possibility of growth effects rather than 
just level effects, and the possibility that climate change will affect the economy outside of 
agriculture. Incorporating these effects into current models of climate change will yield 
predictions that more closely match historical evidence about the relationship between 
temperature and economic performance. 
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Table 1: Observed temperature and precipitation variation, 1950-2003 
  
 Proportion of country-years with temperature […] degrees above/below country mean: 
 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00 1.25 1.50 
Raw data 0.573 0.299 0.144 0.064 0.028 0.011 
After removing worldwide year fixed effects 0.511 0.215 0.085 0.032 0.013 0.005 
After removing region × year and poor × year  
     fixed effects  0.448 0.153 0.051 0.018 0.008 0.002 
       
 Proportion of country-years with precipitation […] 100 mm units above/below country mean: 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Raw data 0.480 0.229 0.121 0.070 0.042 0.027 
After removing worldwide year fixed effects 0.494 0.221 0.113 0.062 0.038 0.024 
After removing region × year  and poor × year  
     fixed effects  0.462 0.213 0.106 0.058 0.032 0.021 
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Table 2: Main panel results 
 
Dependent variable is the annual growth rate 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) 
Temperature -0.325 0.261 0.262 0.172 0.561* 
 (0.285) (0.312) (0.311) (0.294) (0.319) 
Temperature interacted with…      
     Poor country dummy  -1.655*** -1.610*** -1.645*** -1.806*** 
  (0.485) (0.485) (0.483) (0.456) 
     Hot country dummy    0.237  
    (0.568)  
     Agricultural country dummy     -0.371 
     (0.409) 
      
Precipitation   -0.083* -0.228*** -0.105** 
   (0.050) (0.074) (0.053) 
Precipitation interacted with…       
     Poor country dummy   0.153* 0.160** 0.145* 
   (0.078) (0.075) (0.087) 
     Hot country dummy    0.185**  
    (0.078)  
     Agricultural country dummy     0.010 
     (0.085) 
Observations 4924 4924 4924 4924 4577 
Within R-squared 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 
R-squared 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.24 
      
Temperature effect in poor countries  -1.394*** -1.347*** -1.473*** -1.245*** 
  (0.408) (0.408) (0.440) (0.463) 
Precipitation effect in poor countries   0.069 -0.0677 0.0401 
   (0.058) (0.073) (0.089) 
      
Notes: All specifications use WDI data and include country FE, region × year FE, and poor x year FE. Robust standard errors in parentheses, adjusted for clustering at parent-
country level. Sample includes all countries with at least 20 years of growth observations. Poor is defined as a dummy for a country having below median PPP gdp per capita in its 
first year in the data. Hot is defined as a dummy for a country having above median average temperature in the 1950s. Agricultural is defined as a dummy for a country having 
above median share of GDP in agriculture in 1995. Temperature is in degrees Celsius and precipitation is in units of 100mm per year.  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%    
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Table 3: Models with lags 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 No lags 1 lag 5 lags 10 lags No lags 1 lag 5 lags 10 lags 
Temperature × Poor -1.394*** -1.610*** -1.555*** -1.597*** -1.347*** -1.559*** -1.514*** -1.580*** 
 (0.408) (0.525) (0.572) (0.565) (0.408) (0.522) (0.577) (0.579) 
L1: Temperature × Poor  0.514 0.614 0.572  0.576 0.666 0.627 
  (0.439) (0.489) (0.498)  (0.433) (0.479) (0.481) 
L2: Temperature × Poor   -0.334 -0.368   -0.338 -0.354 
   (0.566) (0.580)   (0.570) (0.586) 
L3: Temperature × Poor   -0.105 -0.175   -0.064 -0.152 
   (0.480) (0.489)   (0.489) (0.506) 
Temperature × Rich 0.261 0.206 0.227 0.219 0.262 0.215 0.235 0.234 
 (0.312) (0.323) (0.330) (0.348) (0.311) (0.322) (0.338) (0.356) 
L1: Temperature × Rich  0.135 0.143 0.166  0.137 0.143 0.168 
  (0.300) (0.297) (0.317)  (0.298) (0.299) (0.323) 
L2: Temperature × Rich   0.165 0.158   0.181 0.172 
   (0.257) (0.263)   (0.262) (0.273) 
L3: Temperature × Rich   -0.100 -0.129   -0.110 -0.137 
   (0.271) (0.277)   (0.277) (0.286) 
Includes precipitation vars. NO NO NO NO YES YES YES YES 
Observations 4924 4924 4916 4906 4924 4924 4916 4906 
R-squared 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.23 0.22 0.22 0.23 0.23 
Within R-squared 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 
         
Sum of all temp. coeff. -1.394*** -1.096*** -1.235** -1.171* -1.347*** -0.983** -1.041** -0.858 
in poor countries (0.408) (0.418) (0.527) (0.611) (0.408) (0.416) (0.530) (0.647) 
Sum of all temp. coeff.  0.261 0.341 -0.180 -0.152 0.262 0.352 -0.191 -0.189 
in rich countries (0.312) (0.400) (0.566) (0.786) (0.311) (0.396) (0.546) (0.758) 
         
Notes: All specifications use WDI data and include country FE, region × year FE, and poor x year FE. Robust standard errors in parentheses, adjusted for two-way clustering at 
parent-country and year-region levels. Sample includes all countries with at least 20 years of growth observations. Columns (5) – (8) also include Precipitation × Poor and 
Precipitation × Rich, with the same number of lags as the temperature variables shown in the table. Columns (3) and (7) also include the 4th and 5th lags of Temperature × Poor, 
Temperature × Rich, Precipitation × Poor and Precipitation × Rich. Similarly columns (4) and (8) also include the 4th through 10th lags of Temperature × Poor, Temperature × 
Rich, Precipitation × Poor and Precipitation × Rich; those coefficients are suppressed in the table to save space. Sum of all temperature coefficients in poor countries shows the 
sum (and calculated standard error) of Temperature × Poor and all of the lags of Temperature × Poor included in the regression; sum of all temperature coefficients in rich 
countries is calculated analogously.* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
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Table 4: Alternative specifications of panel results 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Baseline  All FE and 
country 
specific 
trends 
Balanced 
sample: 
1971 - 2003 
Add 
countries 
with < 20 
years of 
data 
GDP data 
from PWT 
Area-
weighted 
climate data 
Sub-
Saharan 
Africa  
Only 
Sub-
Saharan 
Africa 
Excluded 
Panel A: Models with no lags         
Temp. immediate effect – Poor -1.347*** -1.723*** -1.377*** -1.158*** -0.860*** -0.891** -1.881*** -0.904* 
 (0.408) (0.603) (0.484) (0.424) (0.299) (0.347) (0.631) (0.531) 
Temp. immediate effect – Rich 0.262 0.417 0.387 0.595 0.343 0.480**  0.295 
 (0.311) (0.473) (0.323) (0.381) (0.228) (0.220)  (0.323) 
Precip. immediate effect – Poor 0.070 0.026 0.040 0.029 0.050 0.074 0.131 0.032 
 (0.058) (0.137) (0.084) (0.051) (0.069) (0.063) (0.111) (0.071) 
Precip. immediate effect – Rich -0.083* -0.066 -0.101* -0.022 -0.074 -0.087  -0.087* 
 (0.050) (0.089) (0.058) (0.061) (0.060) (0.056)  (0.053) 
Observations 4924 4924 2592 5396 5494 4924 1366 3430 
         
Panel B: Models with 5 lags         
Temp. cumulative effect – Poor -1.041** -2.025** -0.931 -1.067** -0.738*** -0.874* -0.705 -1.318* 
 (0.530) (0.907) (0.943) (0.494) (0.269) (0.522) (0.840) (0.684) 
Temp. cumulative effect – Rich -0.191 0.245 0.276 -0.073 -0.022 -0.053  -0.377 
 (0.546) (0.961) (0.654) (0.582) (0.517) (0.504)  (0.562) 
Precip. cumulative effect – Poor 0.238 0.211 0.221 0.084 0.193 0.241 0.868 -0.003 
 (0.194) (0.290) (0.215) (0.139) (0.169) (0.191) (0.611) (0.141) 
Precip. cumulative effect – Rich -0.127 -0.084 -0.161 -0.039 -0.134 -0.129  -0.121 
 (0.088) (0.208) (0.196) (0.142) (0.094) (0.089)  (0.089) 
Observations 4916 4916 2592 5285 5272 4916 1366 3422 
         
Panel C: Models with 10 lags         
Temp. cumulative effect – Poor -0.858 -1.964 -0.951 -0.791 -0.768** -0.683 -0.803 -0.969 
 (0.647) (1.211) (1.242) (0.641) (0.337) (0.635) (0.994) (0.843) 
Temp. cumulative effect – Rich -0.189 0.582 0.198 -0.059 -0.443 -0.064  -0.469 
 (0.758) (1.414) (0.913) (0.827) (0.822) (0.738)  (0.783) 
Precip. cumulative effect – Poor 0.429* 0.573 0.455* 0.236 0.254 0.435** 0.922 0.234 
 (0.227) (0.413) (0.244) (0.180) (0.182) (0.221) (0.770) (0.153) 
Precip. cumulative effect – Rich -0.195 -0.142 -0.141 -0.183 -0.070 -0.196  -0.180 
 (0.137) (0.370) (0.394) (0.178) (0.134) (0.138)  (0.143) 
Observations 4906 4906 2590 5146 4946 4906 1366 3412 
Notes: All specifications use WDI data and include country FE, region × year FE, and poor x year FE unless otherwise noted. Robust standard errors adjusted for two-way 
clustering at the parent-country and year-region levels are in parentheses. Except where noted, panel A follows the same specification as column (5) of Table 2, panel B follows the 
same specification as column (7) of Table 3, and panel C follows the same specification as column (8) of Table 3.  In column (7), the Sub-Saharan Africa sample incorporates three 
rich countries – South Africa, Gabon, and Mauritius. 
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Table 5: Components of Output Growth 
 
Panel A: Models with no lags 
 Dependent variable is: 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 
Growth in 
Agriculture 
Value Added 
Growth in 
Industrial Value 
Added 
Growth in 
Investment 
Temperature No lags No lags No lags 
Immediate effect – Poor -2.666*** -2.036** -0.895 
 (0.948) (0.878) (1.269) 
Immediate effect – Rich -0.222 0.514 0.182 
 (0.650) (0.452) (0.870) 
Precipitation    
Immediate effect – Poor 0.182 0.238 -0.019 
 (0.135) (0.146) (0.223) 
Immediate effect – Rich 0.16 -0.007 -0.419* 
 (0.119) (0.100) (0.217) 
Observations 3835 3835 4419 
 
 
 
 
Panel B: Models with lags 
 Dependent variable is: 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 Growth in Agriculture Value Added Growth in Industrial Value Added Growth in Investment 
Temperature 1 Lag 5 Lags 10 Lags 1 Lag 5 Lags 10 Lags 1 Lag 5 Lags 10 Lags 
Cumulative effect – Poor -1.26 -1.051 -1.337 -1.835 -0.958 -2.242 1.170 0.128 -0.219 
 (0.882) (1.007) (1.203) (1.123) (1.365) (1.796) (1.287) (1.665) (1.797) 
Cumulative effect – Rich 0.328 0.002 0.236 0.653 0.111 0.321 0.598 -1.38 -1.283 
 (0.678) (0.754) (1.203) (0.572) (0.734) (1.096) (0.894) (1.333) (1.356) 
Immediate effect – Poor -3.684*** -3.703*** -3.797*** -2.091** -2.334** -2.578** -2.235 -1.851 -2.229 
 (1.389) (1.385) (1.416) (0.987) (1.112) (1.172) (1.946) (1.972) (2.025) 
Immediate effect – Rich -0.543 -0.468 -0.566 0.457 0.433 0.404 -0.079 0.19 0.282 
 (0.792) (0.793) (0.815) (0.486) (0.498) (0.500) (1.185) (1.199) (1.172) 
Precipitation          
Cumulative effect – Poor 0.094 0.129 0.052 0.328** 0.205 0.230 0.148 0.007 -0.283 
 (0.120) (0.159) (0.185) (0.158) (0.237) (0.322) (0.268) (0.289) (0.349) 
Cumulative effect – Rich 0.207* 0.394*** 0.476** -0.071 -0.083 -0.113 -0.317 -0.017 -0.519 
 (0.120) (0.143) (0.233) (0.135) (0.229) (0.303) (0.203) (0.336) (0.364) 
Immediate effect – Poor 0.220 0.235 0.252 0.188 0.108 0.078 -0.106 -0.174 -0.190 
 (0.180) (0.197) (0.208) (0.187) (0.168) (0.166) (0.361) (0.402) (0.405) 
Immediate effect – Rich 0.154 0.153 0.169 0.012 0.001 0.002 -0.434* -0.468* -0.457 
 (0.172) (0.184) (0.192) (0.124) (0.132) (0.137) (0.262) (0.282) (0.283) 
Observations 3835 3827 3817 3835 3827 3817 4419 4411 4401 
Notes: Growth in agriculture value-added and industrial value-added are from the World Development Indicators; growth in investment is also from the WDI. All specifications include country FE, 
region × year FE, and poor x year FE. Robust standard errors in parentheses, adjusted for two-way clustering at parent-country and year-region levels. Sample includes all countries with at least 20 
years of PWT growth observations (i.e., the same set of countries considered in the previous tables.)  
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Table 6: Political economy effects 
 
       
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  
 Any change in 
POLITY score 
Leader 
transition 
Regular leader 
transition 
Irregular leader 
transition 
Start of conflicts 
(conditional on 
conflict=0 in t-1) 
End of conflicts 
(conditional on 
conflict>0 in t-1) 
Temperature -0.013 -0.002 0.004  -0.005 -0.006 0.005  
 (0.009) (0.015) (0.015) (0.004) (0.006) (0.060) 
Temperature  0.040** 0.033  -0.017 0.050*** 0.012  0.003  
    X Poor (0.016) (0.023) (0.017) (0.013) (0.013) (0.068) 
Precipitation 0.001 0.003  0.003  0.000  0.000  0.023  
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.019) 
Precipitation  0.008 -0.008* -0.008** 0.000  0.000  -0.031 
   X Poor (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.020) 
       
Obs. 5388 6624 6624 6624 5702 852 
R-squared 0.14 0.18 0.2 0.11 0.09 0.43 
Within R-
squared 0.003  0.001  0.001  0.004  0.000  0.004  
Temperature 
effect in 
poor  0.027* 0.031* -0.013 0.044*** 0.007 0.008 
Countries (0.015) (0.017) (0.010) (0.013) (0.011) (0.037) 
Precipitation 
effect in 
poor  -0.009** -0.005 -0.005* 0.000 0.000 -0.009 
Countries (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.007) 
       
Notes: Columns (1) uses data from the POLITY IV dataset; columns (2)-(4) use data from the Archigos dataset; and columns (5)-(6) use data from the PRIO 
dataset. Columns (1) – (4) include country FE, region × year FE, and poor x year FE; columns (5)-(6) include country FE and year FE. Robust standard errors 
in parentheses, adjusted for two-way clustering at parent-country and year-region levels. Sample includes all countries with at least 20 years of WDI growth 
observations (i.e., the same set of countries considered in the previous tables.)  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%     
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Table 7: Changes in growth and temperature in the medium-run 
 
  Dependent variable:  change in mean growth rate  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Baseline Sample Africa Only Excluding Africa 
PWT 
data 
 OLS Median regression    
Change in  0.952 1.325 0.004 0.440 -1.654 1.318 1.576 
   Temperature (1.021) (0.980) (0.584) (0.747) (2.250) (1.004) (1.135) 
Change in Tem  -2.886** -3.010** -2.261** -2.540**  -2.980** -3.917** 
    X Poor Country (1.420) (1.456) (0.932) (1.177)  (1.435) (1.532) 
Change in  -0.070 -0.047 0.028 0.038 0.034 -0.020 0.025 
   Precipitation (0.097) (0.123) (0.113) (0.111) (0.565) (0.121) (0.111) 
Change in Pre 0.060 0.050 0.120 0.315  0.009 0.010 
   X Poor Country (0.191) (0.214) (0.182) (0.208)  (0.212) (0.238) 
        
Region FE  No Yes No Yes No Yes Yes 
        
Poor Country 
Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
        
Early Period 1970-1985 1970-1985 1970-1985 1970-1985 1970-1985 1970-1985 1970-1985 
        
Late Period 1986-2000 1986-2000 1986-2000 1986-2000 1986-2000 1986-2000 1986-2000 
        
Observations 125 125 125 125 35 87 120 
R-squared 0.04 0.11   0.06 0.19 0.12 
Within R-squared 0.03 0.04   0.04 0.04 0.06 
Tem effect on  -1.934* -1.684 -2.257*** -2.100** -1.654 -1.661 -2.341** 
poor  countries (0.986) (1.088) (0.726) (0.919) (2.250) (1.047) (1.029) 
Pre effect on poor  -0.010 0.003 0.148 0.354** 0.034 -0.012 0.035 
Countries (0.164) (0.167) (0.143) (0.175) (0.565) (0.153) (0.211) 
        
Notes: All specifications have one observation per country. Change in temperature and precipitation are computed for each country as the difference between the mean value in the 
Late Period and the mean value in the Early Period (these periods are indicated in the table for each specification). The dependent variable is the change in mean growth rate 
comparing the indicated Late and Early Periods. Region fixed effects and a dummy for being an initially poor country are included as indicated for each specification. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. For Africa only, we do not split out by poor/rich since we have so few rich country 
observations in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
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Figure 1: Changes and variability in temperature and precipitation  
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Notes: These graphs present data on each country’s temperature (left graph) and precipitation (right graph), potted 
against per-capita GDP from the World Development Indicators in the year 2000. For each country, the circle 
symbols represent the mean level of temperature / precipitation in the first decade of our sample (1950-1959), the 
plus symbols represent the mean level of temperature / precipitation in the last decade of our sample (1996-2005), 
and the gray lines indicate the range of annual temperature / precipitation levels we observe for that country during 
our sample period. Country averages are calculated using population weights, as discussed in the text.  
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Figure 2: Changes in growth and temperature in the medium-run 
 
Notes: Panels A and B plot the change in average annual growth against the change in average annual temperature 
between the periods 1970-1985 and 1986-2000, for rich and poor countries respectively.  
 
